Destruction of Value: An Analysis of Manager Selection Decisions by Institutional Plan Sponsors

by  Heisler, J. Knittel C. R. Neumann, J. J. and Stewart, S. D. Working Paper 

pdf-icon-03042011The authors find, based on US data, that investment products to which money is moved subsequently underperform products from which it is drawn. In allocation decisions among equity, fixed income and balanced investment products, most of that inferior performance is attributed to a combination of style and manager selection decisions. In decisions focusing exclusively on the equity asset class, under-performance is shown to be due primarily to manager or product selections.

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The Selection and Termination of Investment Managers

by Plan Sponsors, Goyal, A. and Wahal, S. Journal of Finance, August 2008

pdf-icon-03042011The research, based on US data, examines the selection and termination of investment management firms by 3,400 plan sponsors between 1994 and 2003. They conclude that plan sponsors hire investment managers after large positive excess returns but that this does not deliver positive excess returns after hiring. Furthermore, they find that if plan sponsors had stayed with the fired manager then excess returns would be no different to the returns delivered by the newly hired manager.

Consultants were found to add value to hiring decisions on average , but they destroy value in advising larger schemes.

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